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CURRENT LAW AND POTENTIAL LEGAL ISSUES
PERTAINING TO AUTOMATED, AUTONOMOUS
AND CONNECTED VEHICLES
William J. Kohler† & Alex Colbert-Taylor††
As vehicle automation technology advances toward vehicle
autonomy and vehicles become increasingly connected, the legal
community anticipates substantial legal issues and developments
pertaining to such technology. The federal government has the power
to regulate the design, sale, and use of autonomous vehicles, has
expressed interest in doing so, and has provided recommendations for
state-level regulations. A few states have recently established laws in
an attempt to ensure the safe operation of autonomous vehicles.
Moreover, the use and collection of locational and other personal data
generated by and required for the effective operation of a network of
connected autonomous vehicles presents significant privacy concerns.
Such concerns must be balanced against the utility of the generated
information in ensuring the safe and efficient operation of autonomous
vehicle networks and the interests of carmakers and other industries
involved in the commercial use of this data. Another concern relating
to automation advances is the threat of cyberhacking and
cyberterrorism. All of the above factors play a role in the timing of
automated vehicle technologies’ implementation.*
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INTRODUCTION
Vehicle automation technologies that modestly manipulate a
vehicle’s direction and speed without driver involvement have already
been introduced into the market and are becoming increasingly
commonplace. Different than mere warning systems, such as those that
sense and warn a driver of fatigue or unsafe speed while approaching a
turn, automated vehicle technologies assume a limited level of
command over vehicle performance. Examples of currently available
automated vehicle technologies include front crash prevention systems,
adaptive cruise control, lane departure prevention systems, blind spot
detection, park assist, backover prevention, and antilock brakes.1
The commercial introduction and consumer acceptance of such
vehicle automation technologies indicate the potential for autonomous
vehicles that assume full command of vehicle operation except under
specific limited circumstances. Although autonomous vehicles have
not yet been offered for mainstream sale, development of autonomous
vehicle technologies has advanced rapidly. Google has been a
forerunner in developing and testing autonomous vehicle technologies,2 while traditional automotive manufacturers have placed an
emphasis on limited automated vehicle technologies and their current
1. See Crash Avoidance Technologies, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, http://
www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/crash-avoidance-technologies/topicoverview (last visited Jan. 30,
2015).
2. See Liz Gannes, Google’s New Self-Driving Car Ditches the Steering Wheel, RE/CODE
(May 27, 2014, 6:59 PM PDT), http://recode.net/2014/05/27/googles-new-self-driving-carditches-the-steering-wheel/.
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determination that drivers must continue to be engaged in driving
vehicles.3
Technological advances in vehicle automation and autonomy will
lead to significant legal developments. This article presents the current
state of applicable law and reviews significant legal issues pertaining
to automated and autonomous vehicles. In addition, because many
vehicle automation and vehicle autonomy technologies are not feasible
without electronic communications between vehicles or between
vehicles and infrastructure—vehicle “connectivity”—this article also
reviews data privacy issues relating to vehicle connectivity.
In Part I, we provide a description of automated and autonomous
vehicle technologies, as well as the parties involved in manufacturing
and operating such technologies that establishes terminology and a
framework for understanding the legal issues reviewed in this article.4
Part II addresses the federal government’s power to regulate the design,
sale, and use of autonomous vehicles.5 We discuss both the potential
extent of this regulatory power under the United States Constitution
and the federal agencies that may regulate areas related to autonomous
vehicles.6 In Part III, we discuss the National Highway Transportation
Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) expressed interest in regulating
autonomous vehicles, what this regulation might look like, and
NHTSA’s recommendations regarding state-level laws and
regulations.7 In Part IV, we discuss the established autonomous vehicle
laws of Nevada, California, Florida, the District of Columbia and
Michigan,8 as well as failed legislative attempts to enact similar laws
in other states.9 In Part V, we discuss legal issues related to the use and
collection of locational and other personal data likely to be generated
by and necessary for the operation of a network of connected
autonomous motor vehicles.10 These issues include the balancing of
privacy concerns against the utility of this information in ensuring the
safe and efficient operation of the autonomous vehicle network and the
3. See Jarah Jacobsson Purewal, Toyota and Lexus Showcase Autonomous Research
Vehicle, TECHHIVE (Jan. 7, 2013, 11:01 AM), http://www.techhive.com/article/2023858/toyota
-and-lexus-showcase-autonomous-research-vehicle.html; GM Studying Operator Behavior in
Self-Driving Vehicles, GM (June 20, 2012), http://media.gm.com/media/us/en/gm/news.detail
.html/content/Pages/news/us/en/2012/Jun/0620_humanfactors.html.
4. See discussion infra Part I.
5. See discussion infra Part II.
6. See discussion infra Part II.
7. See discussion infra Part III.
8. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1–5.
9. See infra Part IV.B.
10. See infra Part V.
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interests of carmakers and other industries involved in the technology
in the commercial use of this data.11 In Part VI, we address the threat
that cyberhacking poses to the autonomous vehicles and related
technologies.12 In Part VII, we discuss the manner in which various
factors, including regulatory efforts and automobile manufacturers’
willingness to commercialize technologies, may influence the timing
of implementation of automated vehicle technologies.13
I.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION REGARDING THE TECHNOLOGY
AND FUNCTIONALITY OF AUTOMATED, AUTONOMOUS AND
CONNECTED VEHICLES SYSTEMS

Some additional background information regarding automated
and autonomous vehicle technologies will serve as a useful foundation
for understanding resulting legal issues. In May 2013, the NHTSA
issued a Preliminary Statement of Policy Concerning Automated
Vehicles, a non-binding document in which the agency described the
potential benefits of automated vehicle systems and provided
recommendations for initial state regulation of automated vehicles.14 In
this document, the NHTSA lays out a useful five-tier framework
defining five relative degrees of automation in a given vehicle. These
five levels are:
• Level 0 (No Automation): “[D]river is in complete and sole control of
the primary vehicle controls (brake, steering, throttle, and motive
power) at all times, and is solely responsible for monitoring the
roadway and for safe operation of all vehicle controls.”15
• Level 1 (Function-Specific Automation): Examples include dynamic
emergency braking, lane maintenance, and similar technologies that
do not “replace driver vigilance.”16
• Level 2 (Combined-Function Automation): Where multiple automation technologies working together (for instance, a combination of
adaptive cruise-control, automatic emergency breaking, and lane
11.
12.
13.
14.

See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VII.
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PRELIMINARY
STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 1 (2013) [hereinafter
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT], available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/Auto
mated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf; Press Release, NHTSA 14-13, U.S. Department of Transportation
Releases Policy on Automated Vehicle Development, NHTSA (May 30, 2013), http://www.nhtsa
.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/U.S.+Department+of+Transportation+Releases+Policy+o
n+Automated+Vehicle+Development.
15. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, supra note 14, at 4.
16. Id.
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maintenance) under specific operating conditions, allow for the driver
to have “his or her hands off the steering wheel AND foot off pedal at
the same time.”17
• Level 3 (Limited Self-Driving Automation): Allows for total
autonomous control of the vehicle except in limited circumstances
where the driver needs to assume control, such as in construction
zones or where the system detects that its map data may be inaccurate,
and it is up to the “vehicle to monitor for changes in those conditions
requiring transition back to driver control.”18
• Level 4 (Full Self-Driving Automation): Complete automation
requiring no human participation beyond setting the destination.19

NHTSA describes Level 3 as the highest level of automation
currently being tested and states that it is not aware of any Level 4
automated vehicle systems in existence.20 However, Google’s recently
announced second-generation automated car prototype, which has no
steering wheel, appears to belong to this category.21
The types of technologies necessary for creating any level of
autonomous vehicle can be categorized as either a sensor- or a
connectivity-based solution.22 Sensor-based solutions, also referred to
as Advanced Driver Assist Systems, “use a combination of advanced
sensors, such as stereo cameras and long- and short-range RADAR,
combined with actuators, control units, and integrating software, to
enable cars to monitor and respond to their surroundings.”23 In contrast,
connected-vehicle solutions “use wireless technologies to
communicate in real time from vehicle to vehicle (V2V) and from
vehicle to infrastructure (V2I), and vice versa.”24 The authors of the
present article believe that the development of dependable technology
within both of these categories, and the convergence of these categories, will be a necessary precursor to the commercial introduction of
substantially autonomous vehicles.25 At those degrees of technological
17. Id. at 5.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 5 n.1.
21. See Gannes, supra note 2 (as the new Google car lacks any way for the occupant to
assume control of the vehicle, it seems necessarily to be a Level 4 vehicle).
22. KPMG & CTR. FOR AUTO. RESEARCH, SELF-DRIVING CARS: THE NEXT
REVOLUTION 10 (2012), available at http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndInsights/Articles
Publications/Documents/self-driving-cars-next-revolution.pdf.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 12.
25. See id. at 25 (“Eventually, convergence will lead to vehicles that can drive themselves
and operate autonomously. . .[C]onvergence also implies a multitude of redundant systems that
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advancement—Level 3 and Level 4—the safe operation of vehicles
without drivers is dependent on the reliable functioning of sensors
detecting risks near a vehicle and the accurate and timely receipt by,
and provision to, multiple vehicles of information about those vehicles
and their respective environments.26
In theory, as autonomous vehicle systems and their commercial
introduction advance from Level 2 to Level 3 to Level 4, the number
and types of participants involved in providing technology and data
will change and increase. At Level 3, traditional vehicle manufacturers
will, as they have already begun doing, create sensor-based solutions
or obtain them from third parties for incorporation into vehicles. To
advance to Levels 3 and 4, they must also create or obtain from thirdparties V2V and V2I technologies that are compatible across the full
spectrum of vehicles, likely necessary to comply with yet-to-bedesignated governmental or industry association standards.27 In
addition, a central party—akin to air traffic control—might provide and
perhaps staff infrastructure, such as data hubs or traffic control stations,
that is necessary to ensure the timely communication of information
about vehicles and their environments.
The timing of technology and its commercial introduction is
uncertain. However, some analysts have attempted to forecast likely
timelines. For example, Morgan Stanley anticipates further penetration
of Level 1 vehicles over the next three years, the introduction of Level
2 vehicles in three to five years, of Level 3 vehicles in five to ten years,
and of Level 4 vehicles in twenty years or more.28

can substitute for one another and yield safe operation even when failures occur. This crash less
future would eliminate the injuries and property damage associated with vehicle crashes and save
more than 30,000 lives a year.”).
26. Id.
27. See id. at 15 (“The regime for connected vehicles is fairly mature. . .but additional
standards will be needed to ensure full interoperability. A mandate, if it occurs, should provide
momentum to develop them.”); PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, supra note 14, at 6 (“NHTSA’s
research will inform agency policy decisions, assist in developing an overall set of requirements
and standards for automated vehicles.”); see also NHTSA V2V Security Credential Management
System ANPRM, FR Doc. No. 2014–24482, 79 Fed. Reg. 61927 (Oct. 14, 2014) (announcing
advance notice of proposed rulemaking and seeking comment on developing a standardized
security credential management system for V2V applications).
28. RAVI SHANKER ET AL, MORGAN STANLEY RESEARCH, AUTONOMOUS CARS: SELFDRIVING THE NEW AUTO INDUSTRY PARADIGM 39 (2013).
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II. EXISTING FEDERAL LAW AND POLICY RELATING TO
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
As of the time of this writing, the U.S. federal government has not
attempted to regulate autonomous motor vehicles as such, though
various administrative agencies, as well as individual legislators, have
signaled their intent to involve themselves in the area. There is no doubt
that the federal government possesses substantial authority to regulate
the design and operation of vehicles used on public roadways and
legislation already exists that will allow certain federal administrative
agencies to regulate many significant aspects of autonomous vehicle
control technology.
Federal agencies already involved with autonomous vehicle
control technology include the U.S. Department of Transportation
(DOT), which oversees the NHTSA and hosts the Intelligent
Transportation Systems Joint Program Office (ITS JPO). The NHTSA,
established by the Highway Safety Act of 1970,29 possesses regulatory
authority to, inter alia, develop and enforce safety standards for new
motor vehicles30 and aftermarket replacement or improvement car
components or equipment.31 An example of relevant rulemaking by
NTSHA are its recent changes to rules that transform the Agency’s
long-standing recommendation that all new vehicles sold in the United
States include an event data recorder (EDR) into a mandate.32 EDRs,
as currently used, are functionally analogous to an airplane’s black box;
recording and archiving for relative short periods of time data from the
vehicle’s various electronic control units for analysis in the case of an
accident or malfunction.33 The data typically collected include
information concerning: “vehicle speed; whether the brake was
activated in the moments before a crash; crash forces at the moment of
impact; information about the state of the engine throttle; air bag
deployment timing and air bag readiness prior to the crash; and whether
the vehicle occupant's seat belt was buckled.”34 Most newer vehicles
29. Pub. L. No. 91-605, § 202(a), 84 Stat. 1739, 1739–40 (1970) (codified as amended at
49 U.S.C. § 105).
30. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101–33118 (2013).
31. See id. § 30102 (a)(7)(B).
32. NHTSA Event Data Recorders Rules, 49 C.F.R. pt. 563 (2013).
33. See 49 C.F.R. § 563.5 (defining “event data recorder”); Press Release, NHTSA 46-10,
U.S. DOT Proposes Broader Use of Event Data Recorders to Help Improve Vehicle Safety,
NHTSA (Dec. 7, 2012) http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/U.S.+DOT+Pro
poses+Broader+Use+of+Event+Data+Recorders+to+Help+Improve+Vehicle+Safety
[hereinafter EDR Press Release].
34. EDR Press Release, supra note 33; see also 49 C.F.R. § 563.7 (data elements).
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are already equipped with EDRs, some of which can wirelessly
communicate with emergency response centers in the event of a
crash.35 The potential role of an EDR as a site where data from all of a
vehicle’s computers might be aggregated and communicated to an
external network makes EDRs a potentially central piece of
technological hardware to watch with legal considerations, such as data
privacy, in mind.
The ITS JPO, a branch of the DOT within its Office of the
Assistance Secretary for Research and Technology, is responsible for
“[c]onducting an ongoing intelligent transportation system program to
research, develop, and operationally test intelligent transportation
systems and to provide technical assistance in the nationwide application.”36 Currently, the ITS JPO is engaged in the development and
promulgation of intelligent transportation standards that will likely
serve as the foundation of V2V and V2I networks for connected and
autonomous vehicle technologies in the future.37 One example of ITS
IPO’s efforts has been its role in developing standards for wireless
communication for connected vehicles, including technologies using
the reserved 5.9GHz Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC)
bandwidth range.38 DSRC was specifically reserved by the Federal
Communication Commission (FCC) for enabling wireless
communication between multiple vehicles on the road and between
vehicles and roadside infrastructure.39 Envisioned as a cornerstone of
connected vehicle technologies, relatively few licenses have been
issued to make use of this bandwidth.40 DSRC applications are in their
infancy, but it is likely that this bandwidth range will become essential

35. Cheryl Dancey Balough & Richard C. Balough, Cyberterrorism On Wheels: Are
Today’s Cars Vulnerable to Attack, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov. 2013, at 6, available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2013/11/cyberterrorism-cars-201311.au
thcheckdam.pdf.
36. Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century (MAP–21) Act, Pub. L. No. 12-141, §
53003, 126 Stat. 405 (2012); About ITS, ITS JPO, http://www.its.dot.gov/its_jpo.htm (last updated
Jan. 22, 2015 9:50 AM).
37. About the ITS Research Program, ITS JPO, http://www.its.dot.gov/its_program
/about_its.htm (last updated Dec. 11, 2014, 3:57 PM).
38. See FCC Rules to Allocate the 5.850-5.925 GHz Band to the Mobile Serv. for DSRC
of Intelligent Transp. Servs., No. 99-305, 14 FCC Rcd. 18221 (1999) (report and order)
[hereinafter DSRC Order].
39. Id.; see also Robert B. Kelly & Mark D. Johnson, Defining a Stable, Protected and
Secure Spectrum Environment for Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1271, 1281–
82 (2012).
40. Kelly & Johnson, supra note 39.
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to connected and autonomous vehicles as these technologies become
prevalent.41
Beyond these transportation-oriented federal agencies, agencies
such as the FCC and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will be
involved in regulating aspects or applications of the technology—the
former in administrating wireless communication standards used by
autonomous vehicles, and the latter in regulating the use of consumer
data, as they have done or proposed doing in the related fields.42
Elsewhere in the government, the Department of Defense has been a
prominent supporter of autonomous motor vehicles, with Defense
Advanced Research Programs Agency hosting multiple competitions,
such as the 2007 Urban Challenge in Victorville, California, to
encourage the development and public visibility of this technology.43
It is almost inevitable that arrival at Level 4 will be accompanied
by an extensive regulatory regime that will ensure the standardization,
safety, and security of autonomous vehicles and their underlying
technologies. It is clear that, for instance, in the absence of such a
regime, there would be no guarantee of the interoperability of the V2V
and V2I systems used in different vehicles, leading at least to
significantly less efficient automated roadway than the smooth-flowing
intersections, intelligently managed traffic patterns, and close-packed
platoons described by industry technologists.44 Beyond these
inefficiencies, one can easily imagine that incompatible V2V and V2I
systems operating on the same communication channels could interfere
with each other, leading to potentially catastrophic accidents.

41. See generally NHTSA V2V Security Credential Management System ANPRM, FR
Doc. No. 2014–24482, 79 Fed. Reg. 61927 (Oct. 14, 2014) (requesting input from the public on
future rulemaking in reference to secure V2V communication systems using the DSRC spectrum).
42. See DSRC Order, supra note 38; FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA
OF RAPID CHANGE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protec
ting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf.
43. See Urban Challenge, DARPA, http://archive.darpa.mil/grandchallenge/ (last visited
Jan. 1, 2015).
44. See, e.g., Emily Badger, What Intersections Would Look Like in a World of Driverless
Cars, CITYLAB (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.citylab.com/tech/2012/03/what-intersections-would
-look-world-driverless-cars/1377/; Sebastian Thrun, Leave the Driving to the Car, and Reap
Benefits in Safety and Mobility, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2011, at D4 (describes platooning).

V31 11_ARTICLE_KOHLER (DO NOT DELETE)

108

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

3/14/2015 3:54 PM

[Vol. 31

III. NHTSA’S EXPRESSED INTEREST IN REGULATING AUTOMATED
VEHICLES
NHTSA is the federal agency that has thus far been the most
visible and active in promoting automated vehicles. It has announced
its interest in regulating autonomous vehicles, as well as its willingness
to advance and support the wide adoption of related technology. As its
name suggests, the NHTSA’s essential function is to maximize
highway safety. The Agency describes its mission as being “to save
lives, prevent injuries, and reduce economic costs due to road traffic
crashes,”45 and as to “achiev[e] the highest standards of excellence in
motor vehicle and highway safety.”46 The NHTSA is also responsible
for setting Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, and therefore
possesses broad authority to regulate the design and use of future
autonomous motor vehicles,47 including the power to preempt contrary
state regulation.48
Insight into NHTSA’s internal concerns about the issues raised by
autonomous vehicles and potential regulatory solutions for overcoming
these issues can be gleaned from the Agency’s Preliminary
Statement.49 Further information can be found in The Potential
Regulatory Challenges of Increasingly Autonomous Motor Vehicles, an
article authored by Stephen P. Wood, NHTSA’s Assistant Chief
Counsel for Vehicle Standards and Harmonization, and three NHTSA
and DOT Attorney–Advisors.50

45. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., THIS IS NHTSA 2 (2006), available at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/reports/810552.pdf.
46. About NHTSA, NHTSA, http://www.nhtsa.gov/About (lasted visited Mar. 23, 2014).
47. Stephen P. Wood et al., The Potential Regulatory Challenges of Increasingly
Autonomous Motor Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1423, 1441 (2012). “The views expressed
in that article fairly encompass the agency’s views of its regulatory authority.” NAT’L HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., REP. NO. DOT HS 812 014, VEHICLE-TO-VEHICLE COMMUNICATIONS:
READINESS OF V2V TECHNOLOGY FOR APPLICATION 33 n.40 (2014) [hereinafter V2V
READINESS REPORT].
48. See 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1) (2013) (expressly preempting State laws that apply to the
same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment as an FMVSS issued
under this chapter); see also, Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L.
REV. 521, 545 (2012) (describing NTSHA’s broad power to preempt state law).
49. See generally PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, supra note 14.
50. Wood et al., supra note 47, at 1423. Note that the article specifically disclaims any
relationship between its opinions and conclusions and the position of NHTSA. Id. at 1423 n.1.
Wood presented that paper at the Santa Clara Law’s spring 2012 symposium on autonomous
vehicles. Symposium, Legal Aspects of Autonomous Driving, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1145
(2012). The papers presented at this conference and published in Volume 52 of the Santa Clara
Law Review are a particularly rich source for perspectives on the law of autonomous vehicles.
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In its Preliminary Statement, the NHTSA recognizes many
potential societal and economic benefits that may arise from autonomous vehicles, from reduced greenhouse gas emissions to enhanced
access for disabled people.51 The Agency was careful to emphasize that
its mission is safety-oriented, and that its purpose in involving itself
early on in the process of developing and regulating autonomous
vehicles is above all because the technology has “the potential to reduce
significantly the many thousands of fatalities and injuries that occur
each year as a result of motor vehicle crashes.”52 NHTSA suggested
that “[p]reventing significant numbers of crashes will, in addition to
relieving the enormous emotional toll on families, also greatly reduce
the enormous related societal costs—lives lost, hospital stays, days of
work missed, and property damage—that total in the hundreds of
billions of dollars each year.” 53
Although NTSHA does not appear ready to issue its own
nationwide regulations specifically relating to autonomous vehicles, it
made several recommendations for how state governments should
regulate the testing and use of autonomous vehicles. The Agency
recommended that states wishing to allow testing should require
specific driver’s license endorsements for operators of autonomous
vehicles, and that a licensed operator should be required to be seated in
the driver’s seat, with the ability to immediately assume control over
the vehicle during all testing on public roads. It recommends that states
require businesses seeking to test an autonomous vehicle certify that
the vehicle has already been operated for some unspecified number of
miles in self-driving mode, and in traffic and environmental conditions
similar to those in which it would be tested on public roads. Data from
these earlier tests should be submitted to the state. The NHTSA also
recommends that state regulatory bodies require testing businesses to
submit plans demonstrating their efforts to minimize risk to others. The
Agency also suggests that states require businesses that test
autonomous vehicles report information about crashes or near-crashes
involving the vehicles, and also any instances in which the vehicles
prompt their human operators to assume control because of the failure
of the automated system to function properly.54
At this still-early stage in the development of autonomous
vehicles, the NHTSA remains deferential to individual States insofar
51.
52.
53.
54.

See PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, supra note 14, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12–14.
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as the States seeking to regulate the testing of prototype vehicles on
public roads, “believ[ing] that states are well suited to address issues
such as licensing, driver training, and conditions for operation related
to specific types of vehicles.”55 However, the Agency has expressed its
preference that States not permit the operation of autonomous motor
vehicles for any purpose other than testing.56 Among the States that
have passed statutes regulating the testing of autonomous vehicles,
Michigan is the only state that has explicitly banned their use in
circumstances other than testing and research.57
It is interesting to note that although no federal law or regulation
currently is explicit in prohibiting the use of autonomous vehicles
outside of the context of testing,58 the NTSHA’s recommendations
appear to presume that operating autonomous vehicles on public roads
is illegal in the absence of either state or federal laws specifically
authorizing their use.59 In contrast, legal scholar Bryant Walker Smith
views the use of autonomous vehicles on public roads and highways as
probably already legal, precisely because they are not explicitly
prohibited in the United States under the Geneva Convention, Federal
Motor Vehicle Standards, or state laws.60 Smith’s theory is based on a
statutory reading to the effect that everything is permitted unless
explicitly prohibited.61 However, because NHTSA has the express
power to conduct investigations into safety defects and can recall and
remedy of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment determined to
have a safety defect,62 it is not a stretch to imagine that NHTSA would
promptly exercise this power if autonomous vehicles were prematurely
introduced onto American roadways. Therefore, NHTSA may exercise
its powers as, effectively, a prohibition, at least if it can reasonably find
that the use of autonomous vehicles presents some safety risk. Such a
55. Id. at 10.
56. Id.
57. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.663 (2014) (“Except as otherwise provided in section
665, a person shall not operate an automated motor vehicle upon a highway or street in automatic
mode.”); § 257.665 (exemptions for research or testing).
58. See Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles are Probably Legal in the United States,
1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 411, 412–13 (2014).
59. See PRELIMINARY STATEMENT supra note 14, at 10–11 (The recommendation that
states not act to “permit operation of self-driving vehicles for purposes other than testing” implies
that without such permission the use of autonomous vehicles would be unlawful).
60. See Smith, supra note 58.
61. Id. at 413.
62. 49 U.S.C. § 30166(b) (2013) (authority to conduct inspections or investigations);
§ 30120 (remedies for defects or noncompliance): § 30118 (notification of defects or
noncompliance). See generally Stephen P. Wood et al., supra note 47.
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risk could probably be found in the mere proliferation of nonstandardized and potentially incompatible autonomous technologies
operating simultaneously.
In addition, Smith attempts to demonstrate how each prevailing
law (the Geneva Convention, federal law, and state law) does not disallow operation of autonomous vehicles, substantially relying on the
concept that, even though such laws require or assume that drivers must
operate vehicles, they do not necessarily require that a driver be human.
He states: “‘Driver’ is a broad concept—so much so that, at least
textually, even nonhuman persons can be drivers.”63 We, however,
believe that the foundation of each regime discussed by Smith is the
material assumption that a human driver—not driverless technology or
a fictitious legal person that might be deemed a driver—is operating a
vehicle being driven on public roadways.
Hypothetically, were Google or another company to start selling
autonomous car conversion kits right now, enabling Smith’s interpretations to be tested in court, we believe it more likely that a judge
would endorse a more conservative textual reading of these laws. We
believe that, because these laws were written well before any serious
discussion of the possibility of autonomous vehicles, where they refer
to a “driver” must be interpreted according to their plain meaning in
light of usage at the time they were adopted. The courts are likely to
find, then, that for a vehicle to be legal in the current regime, it must
have a human operator, and therefore they will probably accept
NHTSA’s apparent position that states or other governments must
specifically authorize automated vehicles to be driven on highways.
IV. STATE LAW AND AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
The NHTSA recommends that states not develop detailed safety
regulations over autonomous vehicles, citing the “rapid evolution and
wide variations in self-driving technologies” as making this
impractical.64 Instead, the Agency recommends that states enforce four
basic principles: (1) ensure that “the process for transitioning from selfdriving mode to driver control is safe, simple, and timely”; (2) “selfdriving test vehicles should have the capability of detecting, recording,
and informing the driver that the system of automated technologies has
malfunctioned”; (3) “installation and operation of any self-driving
vehicle technologies does not disable any federally required safety
features or systems”; and (4) “self-driving test vehicles record
63.
64.

See Smith, supra note 58, at 463.
See PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, supra note 14, at 12–13.
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information about the status of the automated control technologies in
the event of a crash or loss of vehicle control.”65 At the time that
NHTSA issued its Preliminary Statement, three States had already
enacted autonomous vehicle legislation legalizing the operation of
autonomous vehicles on public roads for the purpose of testing. These
laws are substantially consistent with NHTSA’s state policy
recommendations.
A. Enacted Legislation
We will now look in detail at the recently enacted state legislation
authorizing the testing of autonomous vehicles.
1. Nevada
In June 2011, Nevada became the first State to authorize the
operation of automated vehicles on public roads.66 Nevada defines
autonomous vehicle as one equipped with autonomous technology that
which has the capability to drive the motor vehicle without the active
control or monitoring of a human operator.67 Before testing the vehicle
on state highways, the operator must submit proof of insurance for
$5,000,000 or post a surety bond or other form of security for the same
amount.68 The car also must be equipped with several safety measures,
including a means of easily engaging and disengaging the autonomous
technology by the human operator, a visual indicator inside the vehicle
that indicates when the autonomous technology is in operation, and a
mechanism of alerting the human operator to take control if the
autonomous technology fails.69 Upon approval by the state, the tester
will be licensed to operate the vehicle only in specified geographic
zones, but may apply to test in additional zones.70 When testing, the
human operator must be seated in a position that allows the operator to
take immediate control of the vehicle if needed, monitoring the
autonomous technology, and capable of immediately taking over
65. Id. at 13–14.
66. Act of June 16, 2011, ch. 472, §§ 2, 8, [2011] Nev. Stat. 2,873, 2,876 (codified as
amended at NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 482A.010–.200 (2014)); Adopted Regulation Providing for the
Operation of Autonomous Vehicles, 174 Nev. Reg. Admin. Regs. R084-11 (Nev. Dep’t of Motor
Vehicles Feb. 15, 2012) (codified as amended at NEV. ADMIN. CODE ch. 482A (2014)).
67. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 482A.025, .030 (2014) (defining “autonomous technology” and
“autonomous vehicle”); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.010 (2014) (interpreting definition of
autonomous technology to exclude any vehicle unable to perform the operations of driving
without active control or monitoring of a human person).
68. NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.060.
69. Id. § 482A.080(2)(a)–(c).
70. Id. § 482A.120.
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manual control of the vehicle in case of failure of the automated
technology.71 Nevada also releases the manufacturer of the vehicle
from liability resulting from the third party conversion of the vehicle to
an autonomous vehicle.72
Nevada was also the first state to require its motor vehicle
department to propose regulations for autonomous vehicles by a certain
date.73 Nevada adopted its department’s proposed regulations in
February 2012.74 The regulations require a special driver’s license
certification and license plates, along with pre-operation certifications
by the manufacturer that the vehicle complies with safety regulations,
including an electronic data recorder, separate from the NHTSAmandated EDR, that stores information about the condition of
autonomous vehicle system’s state for at least thirty seconds prior to
any accident.75 Nevada requires a cash deposit or surety deposit before
issuing a license to test autonomous vehicles, in the amount of
$5,000,000.76 A certificate will be issued to the licensee that specifies
the geographic regions where a vehicle is allowed to operate.77
Nevada’s regulations also require the presence of a second human in
the vehicle, also trained in the operation of the vehicle and its capabilities and limitations, which “shall each actively monitor for any
aberration in the functioning of the autonomous vehicle while it is
engaged.”78
The State also instituted similar certification requirements before
the vehicles may be sold to the public.79 Either a manufacturer or
licensed technology certification facility must issue the certificate of
compliance in order for the vehicle to be sold, as well as a certification
that the driver is able to operate the technology.80 By allowing
independent facilities to certify autonomous vehicles, Nevada is
creating the opportunity for a market of privately operated certification
facilities. Since this requirement is only for vehicles sold with

71. Id. § 482A.070.
72. Id. § 482A.090.
73. Act of June 16, 2011, ch. 472, § 12, [2011] Nev. Stat. 2873, 2877 (2011).
74. Regulation Providing for the Operation of Autonomous Vehicles, 174 Nev. Reg.
Admin. Regs. R084-11 (Nev. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles Feb. 15, 2012) (codified as amended at
NEV. ADMIN. CODE ch. 482A (2014)).
75. NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 482A.040, .050, .110 (2014).
76. NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.060 (2014).
77. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.120(1).
78. Id. § 482A.130.
79. Id. § 482A.190.
80. Id.
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autonomous technology, it readies Nevada for the commercialization
of autonomous vehicles. While an operator who wishes to drive an
autonomous vehicle for non-testing purposes still must obtain the
vehicle, certificate of compliance, endorsement on his driver’s license,
and private insurance, Nevada’s regulations allow these processes to
begin.
2. Florida
Florida, in April 2012, enacted legislation containing provisions
that were similar or identical to Nevada law regarding autonomous
vehicles.81 These provisions are the definition of an autonomous vehicle,82 the required safety measures for use of the automated technology
in the vehicle,83 a $5,000,000 insurance requirement,84 and the release
of liability for vehicle manufacturers.85 Florida law requires a human
operator who must be a licensed driver affiliated with the company
conducting the test, with no special certifications required. Although
Florida defines operator to include someone who causes the
autonomous technology to engage, regardless of whether or not that
person is present in the vehicle while it operates in autonomous mode,
a human operator must still be present in the vehicle during testing on
State roads.86 The legislation includes the statement that “the
Legislature finds that the state does not prohibit or specifically regulate
the testing or operation of autonomous technology in motor vehicles on
public roads.”87 The statute required Florida’s Department of Highway
Safety and Motor Vehicles to prepare a report making additional
recommendations for legislative or regulatory action by February
2014.88 The document the Florida Department of Highway Safety and
Motor Vehicles eventually published compares its interpretation of the
requirements of the Florida law with the NHTSA recommendations and
the laws passed by Florida, Michigan, California, and their
implementing regulations.89 It concludes that the Florida legislation,
81. Vehicles with Autonomous Technology Act, ch. 2012-111, [2012] Fla. Laws 1223.
82. Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law, FLA. STAT. § 316.003(90) (2014).
83. Id. § 319.145.
84. Id. § 316.86(1).
85. Id. § 316.86(2).
86. Id. §§ 316.85(2), 316.86(1).
87. Vehicles with Autonomous Technology Act, ch. 2012-111, § 1(2), [2012] Fla. Laws
1223.
88. Id. § 5(3).
89. JULIUS L. JONES, FLA. DEP’T OF HIGH. SAFETY AND MOTOR VEH., HSMV NO. 13-008,
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE REPORT (2014), available at http://www.flhsmv.gov/html/HSMV
AutonomousVehicleReport2014.pdf.
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interpreted as setting very minimal barriers to parties interested in
testing vehicles, needed no immediate changes—“In order to
encourage innovation and foster a positive business environment
toward that end, the Department proposes no changes to existing
Florida laws and rules at this time.”90
3. California
The legislation enacted in California uses the language of Nevada
and Florida to define autonomous vehicle and the vehicle’s operator,
but with additional specifications.91 California defines the
manufacturer of an autonomous vehicle as the one who equips the
vehicle with autonomous technology, whether or not that person is the
original physical manufacturer of the underlying vehicle.92 The
California statute also does not release the original vehicle
manufacturer from liability resulting from a third party installation of
autonomous technology, nor does it designate the third party installer
as liable for defects. California permits testing of automated vehicles
on public roads if the operator is an employee of the testing company,
is seated in the driver’s seat monitoring the operations of the
autonomous technology, is capable of taking over manual operation of
the vehicle, and the testing company has an insurance policy in the
amount of $5,000,000.93
The vehicle must also contain a separate device that stores
autonomous technology sensor data for thirty seconds before a crash
while operating in autonomous mode, which must not be destroyed for
three years after the collision.94 California does not suggest who the
owner of that data is. Even though the capture of information
surrounding autonomous technology in individual vehicles was one of
the main recommendations in NHTSA’s Preliminary Statement,
California was the only state to require it statutorily.95 Nevada’s implementing regulations have made it clear that such a system is required
there, as well.96

90. Id. at 7.
91. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West 2014); see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, §§ 227.00–
.52 (2014).
92. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(a)(5).
93. Id. § 38750(b)(3).
94. Id. § 38750(c)(1)(G).
95. Act of Sept. 25, 2012, § 2, [2012] Cal. Stat. ch. 570.
96. Regulation Providing for the Operation of Autonomous Vehicles § 8, LCB File No.
R084-11, 174 Nev. Reg. Admin. Regs. 1223 (Feb. 15, 2012).
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The legislation adopted in California also sets a guideline for
allowing operation for purposes other than testing. The manufacturer
must apply for such permission, including in the application proof that
the vehicle has specific mechanisms for engaging, monitoring, and
disengaging the autonomous technology.97 In cases of failure of the
autonomous technology, the vehicle must have multiple means for the
driver to take control.98 If the driver does not take control, the vehicle
must be capable of coming to a complete stop.99 Additionally, the
Department of Motor Vehicles must adopt specific regulations for
allowing operation of autonomous vehicles by 2015.100 The
Department submitted its proposed regulations for testing vehicles in
late 2013.101 The testing regulations were adopted on May 19, 2014 and
became effective on September 16, 2014.102 Before enactment of this
legislation, California did not prohibit or specifically regulate operation
of autonomous vehicles on public roads.
California’s implementing regulations appear in many aspects to
be similar but not identical to those adopted by Nevada. Notable
differences between the regulations adopted by the two states include
that California does not contemplate private certification companies
being authorized to approve vehicles for testing or sale, that its regulations do not impose geographical limits on its testing licenses, and
that California only requires one person be present in the vehicle during
testing, rather than Nevada’s two.103
4. District of Columbia
The District of Columbia also enacted legislation with the purpose
of authorizing “autonomous vehicles to operate on District
roadways.”104 This language indicates that the District believed
autonomous vehicles were not authorized to do so prior to legislation.
The District defines autonomous vehicle in the same manner as Nevada
and requires only that the driver have a manual control override feature
97. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(c)(1) (West 2014).
98. Id. § 38750(c)(1)(D).
99. Id. § 38750(c)(1)(C).
100. Id. § 38750(d)(1).
101. Notice of Proposed Regulatory Action Relating to Autonomous Vehicles, File No.
2013-1113-02, 48-Z Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 1859, 1868 (Nov. 29, 2013).
102. See First Set of Autonomous Vehicle Regulations are Now in Effect, CAL. DMV,
https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/newsrel/newsrel14/2014_61a (lasted visited Jan.
1, 2015).
103. Compare CAL. CODE REGS. § 38750 (2014); with NEV. ADMIN. CODE ch. 482A (2014).
104. Autonomous Vehicle Act of 2012, D.C. Law No. 19-278, 20 D.C. Stat. 906 (2013)
(codified at D.C. CODE §§ 50-2351 to -2354 (LexisNexis 2014)).
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for the autonomous technology and be seated in the car prepared to take
control at any moment, and that the vehicle is capable of operating in
compliance with District traffic laws at all times.105 The vehicle itself
must be either a 2009 model year or less than four years old when it is
converted to an autonomous vehicle.106 The District limits liability for
vehicle manufacturers when a third party installs the autonomous
technology.107 Although the legislation placed further rulemaking
power with the Mayor,108 this authority was subsequently delegated to
the Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles.109 The Department
promptly acted on this rulemaking authority, providing notice of its
intent to adopt rules “establish[ing] a class of autonomous vehicles and
procedures and fees for registration, titling, and issuance of permits to
operate autonomous vehicles.”110
5. Michigan
Most recently, Michigan passed legislation permitting the operation of autonomous vehicles on public roads.111 While Michigan
expressly authorizes the operation of these vehicles for testing
purposes, it is the only state to specifically ban operation for nontesting purposes,112 a measure publicly criticized by Google.113 Before
testing, Michigan requires manufacturers to register for special license
plates, which must be displayed on the vehicle during testing on roads
and highways,114 and submit proof of insurance.115 The vehicle must
only be operated by an employee or other person authorized by the
automated technology manufacturer while researching or testing the
vehicle on a street or highway.116 One person must to present in the
105. D.C. CODE § 50-2351(1) (definition of autonomous vehicle); § 50-2352(1)–(3)
(requirements to operate autonomous vehicle on public roadways).
106. Id. § 50-2353(b).
107. Id. § 50-2353(a).
108. Id. § 50-2354.
109. Mayor’s Order Delegating Rulemaking Authority under Autonomous Vehicle Act to
Director of DMV, Ord. No. 2014-058, 61 D.C. REG. 2,501 (Mar. 21, 2014).
110. Notice of Proposed Rule Amending Title 18 of the D.C. Municipal Regulations,
61 D.C. REG. 3,587 (Apr. 4, 2014).
111. Act of Dec. 20, 2013, Pub. Act No. 231, [2013] Mich. Pub. Acts (codified at MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 257.2b, 35a, 36, 244, 602b, 663, 665–66, 817 (2014)).
112. See MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 257.663, 665 (2014).
113. Melissa Anders, Autonomous Vehicle Testing Now Allowed Under Michigan Law,
MLIVE.COM (Dec. 27, 2013, 11:40 AM), http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/12/
autonomous_vehicle_testing_now.html.
114. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.244(3).
115. Id. § 257.665(1).
116. Id. § 257.665(2)(a).
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vehicle during testing and must be capable of immediately taking over
the vehicle’s movements.117 Michigan law also provides for civil
penalties for a person violating automated vehicle laws.118 Michigan’s
Transportation Department is also required to prepare and submit a
report, in consultation with the Secretary of State and industry experts,
“to the senate standing committees on transportation and economic
development and to the house of representatives standing committees
on transportation and commerce recommending any additional
legislative or regulatory action that may be necessary for the continued
safe testing of automated motor vehicles and automated technology
installed in motor vehicles.”119 In a separate act, Michigan removed
liability for vehicle manufacturers if damages were caused by
autonomous technology and that technology was installed by a third
party without the vehicle manufacturer’s involvement.120
B. Failed Legislation
State bills that have failed to become law illustrate some of the
issues that stand in the way of universal state acceptance of autonomous
vehicles. For example, in Arizona, Representative Jeff Dial introduced
legislation that would not require a human to be seated in an
autonomous vehicle, a break from the states that have enacted laws.121
The bill failed to clear Arizona’s House Transportation Committee.122
Colorado’s bill was halted by its own sponsor, Senator Greg
Brophy.123 The bill faced considerable opposition from Google and

117. Id. § 257.665(2)(b).
118. Id. § 257.666.
119. Id. § 257.665(3) (no later than February 1, 2016).
120. Act of Dec. 26, 2013, Pub. Act No. 251, [2013] Mich. Pub. Acts (codified at MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 600.2949b (2014)).
121. Autonomous Motor Vehicles, H.B. 2167, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2013); see
also, Howard Fischer, Arizona Lawmakers May Give OK for Driverless Cars, E. VALLEY TRIB.
(Jan. 31, 2013, 7:03 AM), http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/arizona/politics/article_7bd7e9486b35-11e2-9d8e-0019bb2963f4.html; Dan Strumpf, Liability Concerns Put the Brakes on
Driverless Cars, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2013, 12:01 AM ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/drivers-seat
/2013/01/28/liability-concerns-put-the-brakes-on-driverless-cars/.
122. Presentation by the Ariz. Department of Transportation: Hearing on H.B. 2167 Before
the H. Comm. on Transp., 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2013). The minutes, agenda, a video
recording of this hearing are available on the Legislature’s website, H. Rep. Standing Comm. on
Transp., Committee Info, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., AZLEG.GOV., http://azleg.gov/Committee
Info.asp?Committee_ID=5&Session_ID=110 (last visited on Dec. 12, 2014).
123. Monte Wahley, Colorado Driverless Car Bill Shelved Until Further Notice, DENV.
POST (Feb. 5, 2013, 6:44PM MST), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_22526956
/colorado-driverless-car-bill-shelved-until-further-notice.
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from trial lawyers.124 Rather than risk a vote against the legislation,
Brophy asked that it simply be postponed.125 Google did not identify
its concerns publicly.126 Another concern was brought up in Oregon,
whose bill did not pass the Transportation Committee. Legislators there
seemed to simply be concerned about the unforeseeable risks of
automated vehicles. The hearing took place only a few days after the
Boston Marathon bombing and Representative Cliff Bentz, possibly
influenced by this act of terrorism, identified vehicles as carriers of
bombs as a particular concern.127
Finally, New Jersey’s legislation to regulate autonomous vehicles
failed to clear committee after testimony by Scott Mackey, a
representative from the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers.128
Mackey viewed state legislation on automated vehicles as premature,
estimating widespread use of the vehicles to be about ten years away.129
In addition, he stated that if each state enacted slightly different
regulations, it would be difficult for manufacturers to standardize the
technology for the wider market.130 Mackey’s statements appear to
suggest that a code of federal, not state, regulations for automated
vehicles may promote their use more quickly.

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Joseph Rose, Oregon Robo-Car Bill Stalls as ODOT Moves Forward With ‘Connected
Car’ Study, OREGONLIVE (April 18, 2013, 12:48 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com
/commuting/index.ssf/2013/04/oregon_driverless_car_bill_sta.html.
128. For more information, see About the Alliance, AUTO ALLIANCE, http://www.auto
alliance.org/about-the-alliance (last visited Dec. 12, 2014).
129. Andrew George, Driverless cars in N.J.? Assembly Panel Considers Legislation
Authorizing Tests, N.J. BIZ. (Nov. 25, 2013, 3:13 PM), http://www.njbiz.com/article/20131125
/NJBIZ01/131129789/Driverless-cars-in-NJ?-Assembly-panel-considers-legislation-authorizing
-tests.
130. Id.
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C. Concluding Thoughts on State Legislation
Since driverless technology is still very young, allowing the
general public access to automated vehicles would be taking unknown
risks. While each State’s policy has different specifics, the States that
have passed autonomous vehicle testing legislation, in line with the
NHTSA’s recommendations, all require licensing of the vehicle’s
human operator as well as prior approval from the state authorizing the
testing company prior to driving an automated vehicle on public roads.
Apart from these pre-operation requirements, States have instituted
stipulations for insurance, safety mechanisms, and a human operator.
States have also chosen to address liability for autonomous technology
defects, future non-testing operation, and requiring future regulatory
action. Each of the States that has enacted legislation has either
authorized the eventual deployment of autonomous vehicles for
operation by the general public or remained silent on the issue, with the
exception of Michigan, which has only authorized testing of
autonomous vehicles and has explicitly banned the operation of
autonomous vehicles in other contexts.
V. PRIVACY AND DATA USE
Far more profusely than today’s vehicles, mature and marketready autonomous vehicles will generate and broadcast personal data,
the use and storage of which will implicate important privacy rights in
complicated ways that will likely have to be faced well before Level 3
and Level 4 vehicles become a commercial reality.131 Although
exclusively sensor-based autonomous vehicles are certainly a possibility,132 many of the most compelling reasons for adopting self-driving
cars are dependent on the vehicles sharing and coordinating data with
each other, both locally and through centralized infrastructure. It is selfevident that the efficient management of traffic at intersections, the
intelligent distribution of traffic to minimize congestion, and the ability
of autonomous vehicles to safely travel in close-packed platoons, for
instance, are all largely or completely reliant on communication both
between the individual vehicles and other cars in the vicinity, and
between the autonomous vehicles and an external network. Even if this
131. Cf. Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1171, 1239 (2012).
132. Google’s self-driving cars are an example of an almost exclusively sensor-based
technology. See Erico Guizzo, How Google’s Self-Driving Car Works, Posted in Automation Blog,
IEEE SPECTRUM (Oct. 18, 2011, 9:00 GMT), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics
/artificial-intelligence/how-google-self-driving-car-works.
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data is scrubbed of unique individual identifying markers, for instance
VIN-numbers, or IP- or MAC- addresses, data-mining techniques will
almost certainly be able to reconstruct personal identifying information
about particular vehicles and by extension their regular occupants.133
The way this data is used will be the subject of regulation and legal
controversy. Concerns about user privacy have already drawn
substantial attention from the media.134
The privacy concerns fall broadly into two categories: government
access to and use of locational and other personal data, and the private,
primarily commercial, use of the personal data. These issues are
parallel to the concerns that are already emerging around the use of
personal data generated by cellular phones, GPS devices, and Internet
usage, and so the law surrounding many of these issues may be
substantially settled well before any fully autonomous vehicles are
ready for the market. The connected vehicle technologies that will
almost certainly precede autonomous vehicles to the market will raise
essentially the same or very similar privacy and security concerns as
autonomous cars. NHTSA recently announced plans to require the
inclusion of connected vehicle technologies, including both V2V and
V2I, for all new vehicles 2014 connected vehicles initiative.135 These
technologies are therefore likely to be commonplace well before
autonomous vehicles enter the consumer market. How these issues will
be resolved is very uncertain, however, and the path privacy law takes
will certainly have an impact on the rate of autonomous vehicle
adoption. Federal privacy law in respect to these technologies is
extremely underdeveloped and is the subject of a great deal of
controversy, with interested parties having substantially incompatible
views.
Consider how businesses may make use of personal data
generated by autonomous vehicles. Automakers and other companies
133. See Glancy, supra note 131, at 1196, 1200 (showing how individual identity can be
determined without reference to explicit identifiers).
134. See, e.g., Doug Newcomb, Privacy Group Voices Concerns Over Google-Backed
Autonomous Vehicle Legislation, WIRED (June 1, 2012, 3:23 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/
06/watchdog-autonomous-privacy; John M. Simpson, Blog, DMV’s Autonomous Vehicle
Regulations Must Protect Users’ Privacy, CONSUMER WATCHDOG (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www
.consumerwatchdog.org/blog/dmv%E2%80%99s-autonomous-vehicle-regulations-must-protectusers%E2%80%99-privacy.
135. See generally NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., NHTSA ANNOUNCES
DECISION TO MOVE FORWARD WITH VEHICLE-TO-VEHICLE COMMUN. TECH. FOR LIGHT
VEHICLES (Feb. 3, 2014), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases
/2014/USDOT+to+Move+Forward+with+Vehicle-to-Vehicle+Communication+Technology+for
+Light+Vehicles.
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involved in autonomous vehicle technology have already received
patents relating to in-car advertising.136 Manufacturers or third parties
could create advertising profiles based on the past travel of individual
vehicles, derived from metadata that although not specifically identifying individuals as such, effectively achieves the same function. These
advertising profiles could be linked to similar profiles derived from
Internet usage patterns and other consumer data.137 Advertising would
then be able to be specifically tailored to the vehicles’ occupants, and
channeled into the car and its passive occupants, or even into the
surrounding external environment, à la Steven Spielberg’s film
Minority Report.138 The technology that would allow this sort of
individualized targeting of ads based on aggregated metadata is already
widely used in other contexts and underlies much of the advertising on
the Internet.139
If route planning is left to private commercial entities, additional
concerns may arise. In an extension of the in-vehicle advertising
scenario, it is easily conceivable that a vehicle’s route could be planned,
without the users’ knowledge, so that it happens to go by the physical
businesses of paid advertisers. Past driving and purchasing habits could
be analyzed to determine businesses a user would be likely to make
impulse purchases from, and routing and advertising could then be
coordinated to encourage the vehicle users to make unplanned stops.
Vehicles could easily be routed so that, when they need to be refueled

136. For instance, in-car advertising that will likely make extensive use of locational and
other personal data are emerging. Google has already patented technology that would enable adbased taxi services, which would offer free or discounted trips to the brick-and-mortar locations
of advertisers. See Ron Amado, Google Patents Ad-Powered Taxi Service That Would Offer Free
Rides to Shoppers, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 23, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2014/
01/google-patents-ad-powered-taxi-service-that-would-offer-free-rides-to-shoppers. Ford has
patented in-car advertiser technology, and both Ford and BMW are preparing to release in-car
advertising apps. See Damon Lavrinc, You Can Order a Pizza With Ford’s New In-Car App,
WIRED (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.wired.com/autopia/2014/01/ford-applink-dominos-parking/;
BMW Developing In-Car Advertising App, CARADVICE, http://www.caradvice.com.au/267639/
bmw-developing-in-car-advertising-app (last visited Mar. 28, 2014).
137. Among the many types of data available about individuals are records of their past
purchases. Data brokerages gather and sell this information and it is put to myriad uses. For
instance, certain purchasing habits are shown to be strongly correlated to credit worthiness,
apparently including such trivial items felt furniture coaster pads. Thus, aggregated personal data
may be used as a proxy for a credit score in contexts where the law forbids credit from being
considered. See Steve Henn, If There’s Privacy in the Digital Age, It Has a New Definition, NPR
(Mar.
23,
2014),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/03/03/285
334820/if-theres-privacy-in-the-digital-age-it-has-a-new-definition.
138. MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox 2002).
139. U.S. Patent No. US 20120054028 A1 (filed Aug. 31, 2010).
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the nearest gas stations would tend to belong to a company that paid
for that privilege.
Vehicle routing and locational data raises concerns about privacy
and autonomy relative to the government, as well. If government has
access to users’ routing information, it can easily derive information of
a deeply personal nature—as New York’s highest court recently
described:
Disclosed in [locational] data . . . will be trips the indisputably
private nature . . . trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the
abortion clinic, . . . the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or
church, the gay bar and on and on[.] . . . [I]t will be possible to tell . . .
with ever increasing precision who we are and are not with, [and]
when we are and are not with them[].140

Government having unfettered access to this data could only have
a chilling effect on free speech and the expression of political dissent.
If a vehicle’s navigation route decision is actually made by a
centralized government network, there will be additional concerns
about whether this infringes on the individual right to privacy,
including the right to physical autonomy. Vehicle rerouting may be put
to such questionable ends as routing traffic away from public protests.
Other concerns that may arise if these decisions were left to the
government include possible objections from individuals who were
consistently forced to use a route slower than optimal, for the sake of
overall traffic efficiency and at the expense of the individual’s time.
Governments may reserve access to faster routes options to those
willing and able to pay for the privilege.141
Existing federal privacy protections are clearest and strongest
where the party seeking access to an individual’s private data is doing
so under the authority of the government. The Fourth Amendment
guarantees that individuals shall be “secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”142
Under present case law, this clause creates a broad right to privacy,
including a right to have electronic communications and private data
protected, in contexts where individuals have a “reasonable expectation
of privacy,” and where it would be unreasonable for the government to
140. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (2009).
141. This practice would mirror the subscription-based, reserved fast lanes on highways in
cities such as Atlanta. See e.g., I-85 Express Lanes are Open, STATE ROAD & TOLLWAY AUTH.,
http://www.peachpass.com/peach-pass-toll-facilities/about-i-85-express-lanes (last visited Mar.
28, 2014).
142. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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violate this expectation of privacy.143 The application of the reasonable
expectation of privacy test has been unpredictable in the past,144 and it
is not clear whether such a reasonable expectation of privacy will be
found to exist with respect to vehicular location information derived
from GPS data or other tracking technology.
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Jones,145 recently held that
police placement of a GPS device on a person’s vehicle and subsequent
monitoring of that person’s movements constituted a search under the
terms of the Fourth Amendment, but the Court declined to decide
whether the search was unreasonable.146 The Court held that, because
automobiles were “effects” under the Fourth Amendment, the
placement of the GPS device on the vehicle was a physical trespass.147
Because of this, the majority concluded that it did not need to reach the
question of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy existed that
would make GPS tracking an unconstitutional violation of the
Amendment, even in the narrow context of the case, where the GPS
device had placed on a vehicle by police, without a warrant, in the
course of an investigation.148
Justice Alito, joined by three other justices, concurred in the
judgment in Jones and would have found that a reasonable expectation
of privacy existed under the circumstances of the case.149 Justice
Sotomayor wrote a concurrence arguing that she would have found the
use of the GPS tracking data to be contrary to a reasonable expectation
of privacy given the facts of Jones, and argued further that such a
reasonable expectation of privacy would exist even if the police had
not physically placed the GPS device on the vehicle but instead relied
on technology already present in the car.150 She suggests:
GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a
person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations. .
. . Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms. And the Government's unrestrained

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361–62 (1967) (Harlan, J, concurring).
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
Id. at 949.
Id.
Id.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957–58 (Alito, J., concurring).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is
susceptible to abuse.151

Thus, at least five justices might consider government tracking of
autonomous or connected vehicles to be a violation of the Fourth
Amendment’s privacy guarantee, at least in some contexts. Given the
difference between individual police tracking of one particular automobile compared to the possibility of tracking at will the potentially
vast network of connected automobiles, it is not at all certain whether
the courts would find a reasonable expectation of privacy to exist in the
context of autonomous or otherwise connected vehicles.
Even if a strong expectation of privacy were found relative to GPS
and other types of locational data, it is not clear that this would present
government with a substantial barrier preventing access to the
locational data history of individual autonomous or connected vehicle
users, if the government is able to obtain this data from private sources
to whom the vehicle users have constructively granted access. The
United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled in In re U.S.
for Historical Cell Site Data that, in the context of a criminal
investigation and as specifically authorized by section 2703(d) of the
Stored Communications Act (“SCA”),152 police had not committed a
per se violation of the Fourth Amendment by requesting a court order
requiring cellular phone service companies to provide historical location data of three cellphone users suspected of criminal activity, without having first obtaining a warrant or demonstrating probable cause.153
The court characterized the cellphone companies’ records of individual
users’ past locational data as mere “business records,” documenting the
voluntary communication of the phone user’s locational data to his
cellular service provider, where the user was “not conveying location
information to anyone other than his service provider.”154 The court
held “a conventional order for a third party's voluntarily created
business records [does not] transform[] into a Fourth Amendment
search or seizure when the records . . . shed light on a target's activities
in an area traditionally protected from governmental intrusion.”155
Thus, barring further rulings or legislation to the contrary, it is likely
that the government could access an individuals’ autonomous vehicle
location history by requesting records from a third party, such as the
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2013).
In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2013)
Id. at 612.
Id. at 615.
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car’s manufacturer, and thereby skirt the Fourth Amendment concerns
raised by Sotomayor in Jones.156 As described below, there are
presently only very weak protections in place limiting the collection of
personal data, including locational data, by businesses. Thus, In re U.S.
for Historical Cell Site Data presents a very plausible means by which
government may be able to circumvent Fourth Amendment barriers to
surveillance.
Even if the courts where to hold that the locational data such as
that sought in In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data is not a mere
business record, it is likely that other data would be available to
governments that may be sufficient to reconstruct a detailed locational
history of a particular vehicle. By examining metadata and disregarding
explicit individual identifiers, governments may be able to bypass the
Fourth Amendment issues altogether while being able to reconstruct
the individual movements of particular vehicles.157 The ongoing
litigation over the National Security Agency’s large-scale use of
internet and cellular phone metadata to track the movements and
behavior of individuals may lead to the further specification of the
government’s ability to access and analysis these types of data.158
Legislators have attempted and continue to attempt to regulate the
use of GPS and other locational data in order to protect users’ privacy.
For instance, the Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act has been
introduced multiple times since 2011.159 This Act would prohibit, under
most circumstances, acquisition by the Government of an individual’s
geolocation data without first establishing probable cause and
obtaining a warrant.160 The Act, and similar proposed legislation,
appears to have substantial bipartisan support, but despite this, it has
not yet been put to a vote.161
Autonomous vehicles will likely generate other forms of data, not
necessarily associated with location or historical destinations, over
which users may still have a reasonable expectation of privacy. In the

156. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
157. Cf. Glancy, supra note 131, at 1196, 1200 (showing how individual identity can be
determined without reference to explicit identifiers).
158. Cf. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 2013 WL 6819708 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013)
(holding the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata collection program to be lawful) (appeal pending).
159. Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, H.R. 1312, 113th Cong. (2013);
Geolocation Privacy Legislation, GPS.GOV, http://www.gps.gov/policy/legislation/gps-act/ (last
visited Jan. 1, 2015) (showing that the GPS act has been introduced during the 112th, 113th, and
114th Congresses).
160. H.R. 1312 sec. 2(a), §§ 2603–04.
161. Geolocation Privacy Legislation, supra note 159.
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realm of non-autonomous but highly connected vehicles, such data
would include information about a user’s driving habits, such as
information about rates of acceleration, speed, braking data, and the
like, which could be used to demonstrate liability in case of accidents,
to form an individualized and empirical basis for car insurance rates, or
even to automate the process of traffic law enforcement.162 These
particular privacy concerns may be less relevant in a world of fully
autonomous vehicles, where individual vehicle occupants would likely
be unable to cause the vehicle to disobey traffic rules. Still, it is possible
that autonomous vehicles may generate data that could be construed as
evidence of liability it certain contexts, which could raise Fourth
Amendment issues. Future vehicles may default to recording in-cabin
sounds or video, perhaps ostensibly for analysis in case of accidents.163
If such data were stored, it seems there would likely be a strong
expectation of privacy relative to its use in many contexts.
While some limited protections exist preventing the government
from unrestrained access to vehicle users’ private data, very little
regulation exists preventing private parties from collecting, aggregating, analyzing, marketing, and monetizing individuals’ private data in
whatever creative ways they might imagine.
The Government Accountability Office (GOA) recently summarized the existing federal law governing private-sector use of personal
information.164 Aside from limited protection provided to children
under thirteen years old by the Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act,165 and the relatively strong consumer data privacy guaranteed in
the narrower realms of credit reporting and health care,166 GAO identified the only federal limitation on the use of personal data in a
162. This type of data is already collected by many vehicles’ EDR’s. EDR’s as noted in
Section I, became mandatory for all new cars in 2014. Although current regulations limit the use
of EDR data, it is conceivable that it may become the basis for the automated enforcement of
traffic laws.
163. Some new vehicles are already recording cabin audio, including the 2015 Corvette
Stingray. The data recorder in this model records video from the drivers’ perspective as well as
any in-vehicle noise. The Stingray is a high-performance sports car and this data is ostensibly
recorded so that the driver can review past laps on a racetrack, for example. See Jaclyn Trop, The
Next Data Privacy Battle May Be Waged Inside Your Car, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/business/the-next-privacy-battle-may-be-waged-inside-you
r-car.html.
164. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-903, MOBILE DEVICE LOCATION
DATA: ADDITIONAL FEDERAL ACTION COULD HELP PROTECT CONSUMER PRIVACY 7 (2012)
[hereinafter MOBILE DEVICE LOCATION DATA REPORT].
165. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2013).
166. Under the regimes established by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–
81x (2013), and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
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prohibition of “unfair or deceptive acts or practices affecting commerce,” arising from the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).167
GAO further explained:
“An act or practice is unfair if the injury it causes or is likely to cause
to consumers is: (1) substantial; (2) not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition; and (3) not
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves. . . . [an act] or
practice is deceptive if: (1) it is likely to mislead consumers acting
reasonably under the circumstances; and (2) it is material, that is,
likely to affect consumers’ conduct or decisions with respect to the
product at issue.”168

According to GAO, this provision of the FTCA allows in contexts
where “[a] company was not adhering to the practices to protect a
consumer’s personal information that the company claimed to abide by
in its privacy policy.”169
Thus, existing federal protections of personal data are minimal at
best. In the limited contexts where consumer data is protected from
certain uses by law, it is often the case that businesses can easily include
boilerplate contract language and thus avoid liability. There is,
however, substantial pressure from within the federal government and
from external privacy advocacy groups to reform and enhance
consumer data privacy protections. In February 2012, the Obama
administration called for Congress to develop and adopt what it called
the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (CPBR), which, inter alia, would
guarantee individuals control over “how companies collect, use, or
disclose [their] personal data.”170
The CPBR would in effect give legal force to the FTC’s longstanding but non-enforceable guidelines for consumer data best
practices, the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs),171 which are
characterized in the White House’s Consumer Data Privacy in a
Networked World as including: individual control over what personal
104-191, 100 Stat. 2548 (1996).
167. MOBILE DEVICE LOCATION DATA REPORT, supra note 164 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45).
168. Id. at 7 n.11 (internal citations omitted).
169. Id. at 7.
170. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED
WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE
GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 11 (2012) [hereinafter PRIVACY BLUEPRINT], available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.
171. The FIPPs framework originated in a 1973 report on Automated Personal Data
Systems. See DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS,
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA
SYSTEMS ch. IV (1973) (“Recommended Safeguards for Administrative Personal Data Systems”).
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data businesses can collect and how this data may be used; transparency
in businesses’ data collection, privacy and security practices; respect
for context, recognizing that “consumers have a right to expect that
companies will collect, use, and disclose personal data in ways that are
consistent with the context in which consumers provide the
data[]”172and the secure handling of personal, private data; the
consumers’ right to access and ensure the accuracy of personal data;
the principle of focused collection, guaranteeing reasonable limits on
the personal data that companies collect and retain.173 To these
established FIPPs principles, the CPBR would add a right of
accountability, ensuring that the preceding principles would be
enforced.174
Among the more substantial guarantees of the CPBR would be the
consumer’s right to access and verify the accuracy of personal data
stored by private companies, providing individuals with “the means
and opportunity to correct inaccurate data or request its deletion or use
limitation,”175 as well as a right to impose “reasonable limits on the
personal data that companies collect and retain,”176 restricting the
collection and use of personal data appropriate to the context in which
the users provided them with the data.177 The White House
recommended that the CPBR be implemented as “enforceable codes of
conduct,” developed through a “multistakeholder process,” involving
“individual companies, industry groups, privacy advocates, consumer
groups, crime victims, academics, international partners, State
Attorneys General, Federal civil and criminal law enforcement
representatives, and other relevant groups[.]”178 Envisioning such a
process, the White House document does not provide any model
language for legislation or regulation.
Government bodies and other organizations have advanced
proposals similar to the White House’s CPBR, developed contemporaneously to the White House document or in the two years since the
White House document was issued. For instance, in a March 2012
report the FTC released a set of recommendations very much in-line
with those of the White House, seeking cooperation between stakeholders and policymakers in developing what would ultimately be an
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

PRIVACY BLUEPRINT, supra note 170, at 15.
Id. at 18–20.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 23.
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enforceable code of conduct modeled on the FIPPs.179 In September
2012, GAO issued a report recommending that the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration work with
stakeholders to develop an analogous code of conduct relating specifically to location data derived from mobile devices.180
An earlier effort at establishing a variation on the FIPPs specific
to the connected vehicle context was Vehicle Infrastructure Integration
(VII) Coalition’s VII Privacy Policy Framework.181 The VII Coalition,
disbanded in 2007, was an association of automakers, privacy advocate
groups, and other interested parties, organized by the DOT that studied
the potential implementation of a DSRC-based connected vehicle
system to enhance vehicle safety.182 The VII Privacy Policy
Framework, achieved by consensus-building between the participant
stakeholders and not legally binding, promulgated principles including
“Respect for Privacy and Personal Information[,] . . . Information
Purposes, Acquisition, Notice, Fair Information Use, Information
Protection
and
Retention,
Openness,
Participation
and
Accountability.”183 Beyond this repetition of familiar FIPPs principles,
the Framework included hard “privacy limits” that sought to limit the
possibility of personal identifiers broadcast over DSRC being collected
and used without the individual vehicle operators’ consent.184 Legal
scholar Dorothy Glancy has suggested that the VII Privacy Policy
Framework should be adopted as a model for establishing autonomous
vehicle privacy standards, both as an example of stakeholder consensus
building and because of the strong protections it would provide against
the wholesale acquisition of user identifiers.185
It is clear that there is broad resistance to the very businessfriendly status quo in the area of consumer data privacy rights, but it is
less clear that anything like the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights will
actually be enacted in the foreseeable future. Further, given the deep
involvement in the policy-making process interested companies will
179. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012), http://www.ftc.gov
/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumerprivacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf.
180. MOBILE DEVICE LOCATION DATA REPORT, supra note 164, at 37.
181. LESLIE JOHNSON ET AL., VII PRIVACY POLICY FRAMEWORK VERSION 1.0.2 (2008),
available at http://financecommission.dot.gov/Documents/April2008Meetings_Hearings/VII_
Privacy_Policies_Framework-Approved_by_ELT.pdf
182. Id.
183. Glancy, supra note 133, at 1233.
184. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 181, at 23.
185. Glancy, supra note 133, at 1235.
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have as key stakeholders, it is perhaps doubtful that even if something
akin to the CPBR were to be implemented that it would present a very
great obstacle to the use of personal data in all but the most plainly
illegitimate circumstances. In any case it appears that little substantive
movement toward bringing the White House’s proposal to fruition has
been made in the intervening years, and in the meantime Big Data
business techniques have become more and more ubiquitous. Unless
consumers are more consistently vocal in their opposition to the
commercial use of data derived from their vehicle use patterns then
they have been historically to the use of similar data derived from their
cellular phone, credit card, and internet usage habits, it seems unlikely
that businesses in the automated and connected vehicle industries will
be substantially barred from using consumer data in whatever manner
they see fit.
Another route by which more substantial consumer data protection may conceivably come about would be through action by state
governments. Sufficiently populous and powerful states may have
leverage sufficient to require autonomous vehicle makers to disclose to
state residents the data they collect and the uses to which the that data
is put. Such legislation has already been proposed in California.186 The
Consumer Vehicle Information Choice and Control Act seeks to
require manufacturers of new motor vehicles sold after January 1, 2016
to make disclosures to the vehicles’ owners regarding the information
generated and collected by the vehicle.187 The owner would have full
and sole access to the information and be able to transmit it to a third
party.188 The manufacturer would not be able to take action against the
owner for accessing or using the information.189 In limited
circumstances a manufacturer or medical researcher would be able to
access and use the collected information, provided all personally
identifying information is removed.190 If California or another state
succeeds in passing such legislation, it will likely not have the same
level of national impact that California’s strict vehicle emissions laws
have had. This is because the bill will not necessarily require the
vehicle makers invest in any special new technology in order to access
California’s large markets—technology which would then be native to
all vehicles whether they were sold in California or not. Instead, it
186. S.B. 994, Leg. 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. 7 (Cal. 2014), available
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140SB994.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.

at
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would only grant a special right of access to information to vehicle
owners in that state, leaving the manufacturers with full control of the
data for users in every jurisdiction that was not subject to equivalent
legislation.
The 2012 push for consumer privacy protections seems to have
made little progress, but there is some recent movement in Washington
with respect to automakers’ usage of personal data. In a December 2,
2013 open letter to auto industry executives, Senator Edward Markey
of Massachusetts raised concerns about the disclosure of individual
user data and aggregated data from vehicles currently on the market,
seeking information from automakers as to whom this data is shared
with or sold to, how long the data is kept, whether vehicle users have
any option to delete this data or else to have it not retained at all, and
similar questions.191 Senator Markey requested that automakers
respond to his inquiry no later than January 3, 2014.192 The Senator has
not disclosed whether any responses were submitted, and if so, whether
these responses will be made public.
VI. SECURITY, CYBERATTACKS, AND TERRORISM
Senator Markey’s letter also focuses its attention on the vulnerability of connected vehicles to cyberattacks, citing DARPA-funded
research that exposed the susceptibility of the electronic control units
of certain vehicles already on the market.193 These vehicles could be
hacked, enabling external control of braking, acceleration, and steering.194 Senator Markey asked the manufacturers for information on
their plans for overcoming these risks.195 Such information would be
helpful in determining the feasibility of NHTSA’s stated goal of
insulating the automated, connected vehicle infrastructure it foresees
from potential cyberattacks.196
Although the primary example of vehicle hacking cited by Senator
Markey relied on being physically present in the vehicle, contemporary
cars have been proven susceptible to wireless attacks as well.
Researchers from Rutgers and the University of Southern California
were able to control vehicles’ electronic control units (ECUs), accessed
191. Letter from Edward J. Markey, Senator, to Auto Industry Executives, at 7 (Dec. 2,
2013), available at http://www.markey.senate.gov/documents/2013-12-2_GM.pdf.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1; see also CHARLIE MILLER & CHRIS VALASEK, ADVENTURES IN AUTOMOTIVE
NETWORKS AND CONTROL UNITS (2013), available at http://illmatics.com/car_hacking.pdf.
194. Id.
195. Markey, supra note 191.
196. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, supra note 14, at 8.
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through their wireless tire pressure monitoring systems.197 It has been
suggested that an attack might be staged by exploiting a vehicle’s EDR
system, which in newer vehicles are accessible wirelessly and may
communicate remotely with emergency response centers.198 The
remote hijacking of autonomous vehicles presents a very serious risk
in a world of fully automated motor vehicles, where, for instance,
traditional traffic signals would be rendered obsolete by the possibility
of coordinating the flow of traffic through intersections, making realtime speed adjustments such that traffic from two perpendicular
multilane highways could cross paths without any vehicles coming to
a stop or even substantially slowing down. One vehicle making a
sudden and unannounced change in its path could cause significant
damage and disruption. Many autonomous vehicles being hijacked at
once in an urban center could lead to terror on the scale of the
September 11 attacks.
Ensuring that autonomous and connected vehicle technologies are
secure from such exploitation is a responsibility of NHTSA.199 DOT
and NHTSA, as well as various industry players, are dedicating
significant resources to understand strategies to insulate vehicles from
attack.200 NHTSA has stated its goal of developing an “initial baseline
set of requirements”201 to ensure that the ECUs in contemporary and
future vehicles, including autonomous vehicles, are secure from
cyberattack.202 In NHTSA’s Preliminary Statement, the Agency
suggests that the process of developing these requirements should be
complete within four years of that document’s 2013 publication.203
Although the evidence suggests that the ECUs of vehicles
currently on the market are not well secured against attack, it does
appear at least that such attacks would attach federal criminal liability
to their perpetrators. Any substantial attempt at an attack designed to
exploit and take control over a modern car’s ECUs would almost
certainly subject the attacker to federal criminal liability under the

197. See Peter Bright, Cars Hacked Through Wireless Tire Sensors, ARS TECHNICA (Aug.
10, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/security/news/2010/08/cars-hacked-through-wireless-tyresensors.ars.
198. Balough & Balough, supra note 35, at 1.
199. See PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, supra note 14, at 8.
200. See NHTSA V2V Security Credential Management System ANPRM, FR Doc. 2014–
24482, 79 Fed. Reg. 61927 (Oct. 14, 2014).
201. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, supra note 14, at 7.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 8.
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Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA),204 the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA),205 the Wiretap Act,206 and potentially the USA
PATRIOT Act.207
VII. REGULATORY OPTIONS, COMMERCIAL PROSPECTS AND THE
POTENTIAL PACE OF CHANGE
Although automotive industry analysts have attempted to anticipate the timing of automated vehicle technology deployment based on
a variety of factors, the authors have concluded that timing will be
substantially affected by three key variables that are generally
unacknowledged by industry analysts. Each of these three variables
involves the promise of significantly improved vehicle safety.
Beyond necessary technological developments, analysts generally
concur that the following factors, expressed as barriers to achieving
successive levels of automation, must be ameliorated to arrive at Levels
2 and 3, and eventually eliminated to arrive at Level 4:
(1) Limited driver acceptance of diminished control over vehicles. As
noted in the report jointly issued by the Center for Automotive
Research and KPMG LLP: “There is no margin for error with
safety-critical technologies. They must work perfectly every time;
life and death hang in the balance. Consumers will not relinquish
control until they are certain their vehicles and the mobile
environment are 100 percent safe and reliable.”208
(2) Unacceptably high technology costs with respect to both automated
vehicle technology and accompanying infrastructure. Presently,
only 20% of consumers surveyed would be willing to spend as much
as $3,000 for automated vehicle features.209
(3) Lack of cybersecurity, particularly with respect to V2V and V2I
technologies that by their nature involve multiple, and perhaps
many, vehicles whose functioning could be disrupted to cause
catastrophic damage. NHTSA and DOT are working together with

204. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008)
205. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
206. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (June 19, 1968); Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(Oct. 21, 1986) (amending the Wiretap Act to include electronic communication).
207. Arguments for and against finding liability under these acts can be found in Balough
& Balough, supra note 35, at 5–7. The authors of that article are perhaps unduly skeptical that a
vehicle’s ECUs would be found to be “protected computers” under the language of CFAA,
suggesting that they may not sufficiently be “used in or affect[] interstate or foreign commerce.”
The DMCA similarly requires that an intercepted communication affect interstate commerce.
208. KPMG & CTR. FOR AUTO. RESEARCH, supra note 22, at 19.
209. Id. at 20.
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industry to establish a secure V2V credentialing system that may
alleviate these concerns.210
(4) Lack of aftermarket automated vehicle technologies to accel-erate
vehicle market penetration and, therefore, consumer acceptance and
technology cost reductions.

Uncertainty as to who is liable for damages caused by automated
vehicle crashes is cited by industry analysts as an impediment to
implementing truly autonomous Level 4 vehicles,211 but the authors
view this as a concern to be addressed, rather than a fundamental
impediment. As vehicle automation serves to reduce both crash rates
and associated damage claims, the risk borne by insurance companies
will also decline.212 To maintain competitive standing, insurers can be
expected to adapt timely to liability issues as technological advances
reveal them, although they may resist providing insurance for Level 3
and 4 vehicles if there is any possibility of technology failure or cyberhacking that could cause catastrophic damage involving multiple
vehicles and property owned by third parties. Similarly, states, which
must enact legislation authorizing the use of Level 3 and Level 4
vehicles on roadways, will likely resist doing so until they determine
that such vehicles will not pose unreasonable safety hazards, probably
with input from insurers. Other systems, such as the nation’s system of
air travel, have been insurable despite similar liability issues as those
presented by autonomous vehicles systems. The authors recommend
that significant resources be dedicated by stakeholders to formulating
a proposed “architecture” for insuring autonomous vehicle systems.
With respect to legal battles over general responsibility for
damages, those proven responsible for damages should be held
accountable within the traditional, tort-based legal framework, though
the process of determining liability can be expected to become more
complicated as technology becomes more complex and the number and
types of technology providers increases, as discussed in Section I.
Data privacy concerns are also cited as an impediment to implementing automated vehicles.213 However, as we have shown, privacy
concerns are not generally different in the automated vehicle context
than any other involving technology developments accompanied by the
prolific dissemination and accumulation of personal information.
210. See NHTSA V2V Security Credential Management System ANPRM, FR Doc. 2014–
24482, 79 Fed. Reg. 61927 (Oct. 14, 2014).
211. SHANKER ET AL., supra note 28, at 18.
212. Id. at 57.
213. See Wood et al., supra note 47 at 1448. See generally, Glancy, supra note 131.
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Therefore, it would seem that privacy concerns in the automated
vehicle context should not be any more of an impediment to the introduction of automated vehicle technology than has been the case with
respect to other already widely-adopted technologies, such as social
media, smartphones, or GPS navigation. Accordingly, barring a catastrophic misuse of personal information by vehicle manufacturers or
related parties that accumulate information, the regulation of private
information use in the automated vehicle context should not be
expected to proceed at a different pace than with respect to such other
technologies.
The three safety-related variables identified by the authors as
significant factors affecting the timing of automated vehicle technology
implementation are:
(1) the degree to which automobile manufacturers conclude that safetyrelated automated vehicle technologies present profitable
commercial opportunities;
(2) the extent to which they perceive implementation of such technologies to be a corporate social responsibility; and
(3) whether NHTSA will accelerate deployment by preemptively
mandating vehicle automation technologies.

A confluence of circumstances indicates that automobile manufacturers and NHTSA may move aggressively with respect to technology implementation, rather than reluctantly. First, the proliferation
of developing, existing and implemented vehicle automation safety
features is enabling the development of a vision of radically safer
vehicle travel. That vision should not necessarily be impaired by
automobile manufacturers’ reluctance to commercialize safety
technologies because experiences of the past four decades demonstrate
that safety features that add to the cost of vehicles (e.g., airbags) are
frequently desired, and sometimes eventually sought after, by
consumers, rather than avoided.
The hazards of vehicle travel are seen in data gathered and
published by NHTSA. In 2011, the last year for which NHTSA has
publicly released data, 2,217,000 people were injured in American
crashes; 32,367 people were killed; and 3,778,000 crashes caused
property damage.214 These statistics represent a significant decline in
incidents, as measured annually, over the preceding three years; but
over the course of the preceding ten years, a total of 392,872 people
214. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 811 753, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS
2011 DATA 1 (2013).
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were killed in vehicle crashes and 25,397,000 were injured.215 In
consideration of these statistics, vehicle crashes are an immense social
issue, with associated costs in terms of loss of life, limb and property.
The NHTSA recognizes the gravity of this issue and hopes to address
it by expanding the use of more advanced crash avoidance
technologies.216 The issue persists even in the face of enormous strides
made by automobile manufacturers toward improving vehicle safety,
intensified enforcement of laws that prohibit driving under the
influence of alcohol and narcotics, increasing disinterest in driving
among younger people who are disproportionally involved in vehicle
crashes, and NHTSA’s robust regulatory scheme of regulations,
including mandated safety features such as airbags, seatbelts and
electronic stability control.217
If the next frontier for significantly, or perhaps radically,
improved vehicle safety is to be found in automated vehicle technology, then NHTSA has several methods with which to advance its
implementation. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act,218 NHTSA may establish vehicle safety standards for new motor
vehicles and motor vehicle equipment, require the recall and remedy of
vehicles and equipment that do not comply with standards, conduct
investigations into safety defects, and require the recall and remedy of
motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment determined to have a
safety defect.219 As noted by Wood, case law indicates that “NHTSA
can establish standards to require the installation of certain specific
equipment on vehicles and establish performance standards for that
equipment.”220 Under the Safety Act, standards must be performanceoriented, objective, meet the need for safety and be practicable.221
Further, NHTSA hosts its New Car Assessment Program, under which
vehicle crashworthiness is ranked on a five-star scale (for which five
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101–33118 (2013).
219. Id. § 30110 (motor vehicle safety standards), § 30166(b) (authority to conduct
inspections or investigations), § 30120 (remedies for defects or noncompliance), § 30118
(notification of defects or noncompliance).
220. Wood et al., supra note 47, at 1450. To support this, Wood cites Washington v. Dept.
of Transp., 84 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding NHTSA’s regulatory authority enables it to
require specific equipment be installed in vehicles). Additional cases cited in Wood and in the
Washington v. DOT case in support of this authority include Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp. 865
F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988); Chrysler Corp. v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1969); Automotive
Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
221. Wood et al., supra note 47, at 1450.
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stars is highest) and information about selected advanced crash
avoidance technologies is made available to the public to promote such
technologies.222 As Wood also notes, “NHTSA selects crash avoidance
technologies for inclusion in NCAP’s crash avoidance ratings program
based on technical maturity of the technology, the availability of the
technology in the current fleet, and the availability of safety
effectiveness data for the technology.”223
Therefore, NHTSA can speed the implementation of automated
vehicle technologies by establishing standards that require such technology, so long as such standards are performance-oriented, objective,
meet the need for safety and are practicable. Alternatively, it can simply
establish standards as the automotive industry rolls out technology,
while also encouraging the proliferation of technology by including it
in its New Car Assessment Program.
Different than ever before, however, the proliferation of
technology provides NHTSA with regulatory opportunities, while
automobile manufacturers may also conclude they have commercial
opportunities, and a social responsibility, to accelerate the adoption of
automated vehicle technologies and, in so doing, further address the
hazards of vehicle travel.

222.
223.

Id. at 1426–27.
Id. at 1494.

